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Moral Visions and the New American Politics
The presidential election of 2000 was one of the most remarkable
in American history for a variety of reasons. The extraordinary
closeness of the race and the protracted legal battle over its ultimate
outcome were both unprecedented and unlikely to be repeated.
Beyond the questions of how the Florida morass should have been
resolved and whether the election was “stolen” from its rightful
victor, however, are more fundamental ones about the changing
nature of partisan politics in America. Putting legal arguments aside,
the political reality is that George Bush and Al Gore finished the
2000 campaign essentially in a dead heat, despite the tremendous
advantages that Gore possessed from the outset of the campaign. He
was the sitting vice president in an administration that had presided
over a decade of almost incredible economic prosperity, in which
unemployment, inflation, and interest rates simultaneously flirted
with historic lows and the stock market generated significant
wealth for a broad segment of the American population. He was heir
apparent to an incumbent who, despite his personal foibles, enjoyed a
steady job approval rating in excess of 60 percent. His opposition
from Bill Bradley in the Democratic primary had evaporated quickly,
and had been much less substantial and bruising than what his
opponent had faced from John McCain. Finally, Gore’s political
experience and knowledge of public policy, both foreign and
domestic, were indisputably greater than Bush’s. Thus, it is no
wonder that the electoral forecasting models honed over many years
by political scientists almost universally predicted a handy Gore
victory, with most positing that he would win between 55 and 60
percent of the national popular vote.1
And yet, of course, these models were wrong. Their central and
most common failing was to exaggerate the importance of economic
evaluations in shaping presidential vote choice. In this regard,
political scientists were no different from much of the popular press,
largely accepting James Carville’s 1992 mantra that “it’s the
economy, stupid!” Indeed, there was good reason to hold to the view
that it would be very difficult to unseat an incumbent party in such
flush times. At least since the New Deal era, economic issues had
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consistently been at the center of presidential campaigns, and a
citizen’s perceptions of how the incumbent party had handled the
nation’s economy were reliable predictors of his vote on election day.2
Based on these assumptions, Gore was clearly in good shape.
According to the 2000 American National Election Study,3 about 80
percent of Americans thought that the Clinton/Gore administration
had done a good job in handling the nation’s economy (and most of
the rest were committed Republicans whose votes Gore could not
hope to win in any case). Strikingly, however, more than 40 percent
of these same people voted for George Bush in the presidential
election. This sort of widespread defection from an incumbent party
receiving such high marks for economic performance was unprece-
dented in modern American politics. Clearly, there were some
idiosyncratic and election-specific factors involved in producing this
surprising pattern—Gore ran what was by most accounts a relatively
poor campaign, Bush significantly exceeded expectations in the
debates, etc. More fundamental, however, was a shift in the basis of
issue contestation between the two parties. The bread-and-butter
economic issues that had shaped American politics since at least since
the New Deal era did not dominate the electoral landscape in 2000.
Instead, voter loyalties were shaped in critical ways by an issue that
for many of them trumped economic interest: competing and starkly
different moral visions of the good society.
To grasp the depth of the shift that has occurred in recent American
politics, it is important to understand the traditional alignment of
the American political parties. From the 1930s into the 1990s, the
primary dividing line between Republicans and Democrats was an
economic one. Democrats, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt,
championed an expansive array of social programs, a broad net that
would cover areas ranging from unemployment to education to health
care. Republicans, by contrast, were typically opposed to these New
Deal and Great Society programs, or at least in favor of more modest,
less expensive versions. Fundamentally, one’s self-classification as a
Democrat or a Republican depended on whether one supported a
larger, more comprehensive welfare state with its accompanying
higher taxes or a smaller, more limited one with attendant lower taxes.
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As a result, party allegiance quite naturally fell at least roughly along
class lines. Republicans represented the affluent, Democrats
represented the poor and working class, and both parties battled for
those in the middle, whose votes determined the outcomes of
elections. Higher levels of income and education, the clearest
demographic indicators of social class in America, were strongly
associated with Republican allegiance from the 1930s all the way
through the 1980s. Moral and religious issues remained clearly
secondary to the partisan alignment, and peripheral to the meaning of
“liberal” and “conservative” in America.
For proof of this claim, one need look no further than two major-
party candidates for president during that era. When Barry Goldwater
became the Republican nominee in 1964, he was generally regarded
as the paradigmatic staunch conservative, perhaps even radically or
frighteningly so. Goldwater, who served for many years as a senator
from Arizona after his unsuccessful presidential bid, was not
especially religious and was a supporter of legalized abortion and
expanded homosexual rights.4 Conversely, Jimmy Carter, the
Democratic candidate in 1976 and 1980, was a devout evangelical
Christian, a Southern Baptist who spoke in biblical terms of having
committed adultery “in his heart” by having looked with lust on a
woman other than his wife. As late as 1976, in Carter’s race against
Gerald Ford, it was not entirely clear which major party candidate was
more pro-life or pro-choice on the abortion question.5 Needless to say,
it is almost unimaginable today that such candidates would be their
respective parties’ standard-bearers. The essence of what it means to
be a Democrat or a Republican, a liberal or a conservative, has
changed significantly over the past two decades, not moving away
altogether from the economic issue dimension but adding to it in a
very prominent place a dimension of competing moral visions. It is
this shift in the issues that divide the parties that made possible
George Bush’s victory in 2000 over an opponent bearing the mantle
of peace and prosperity.
A decline in the predominance of economic issues as bases for
political contestation is consistent with the theory of “post-
materialism” advanced for some time by Ronald Inglehart and
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colleagues.6 According to this view, increasingly broad-based
affluence in advanced industrial societies allows people to move
beyond a politics that focuses on basic material needs and economic
security, as these are largely taken for granted in nations far removed
from any real economic privation (especially by younger
generations). In their place, citizens are able to focus on issues that
bear less directly on their own tangible well-being and deal more with
their competing normative visions of the good life and the rightly
ordered society. From this shift toward post-material politics,
according to Inglehart, stemmed the environmentalist, feminist, and
civil liberties movements of the 1960s and 1970s, just to name a few.
While this insight explains much about politics in the Western world
over the past 40 years, it has the potential to be a bit misleading.
Inglehart’s early vision of the post-material revolution pitted a young,
post-material left, committed to the environment, civil liberties, and
sexual liberation, against an aging materialist right, committed to
maximizing wealth and social stability. The past two decades have
witnessed, however, a post-material transformation on the right as
strong as that on the left. Both liberals and conservatives, in America
and Europe alike,7 are now defined as much by their moral/cultural
stances as by their economic ones—witness the transition of the
Republicans from a “country club party” to one strongly influenced
by conservative evangelical Christians. In light of Inglehart’s theory
and subsequent modifications, it is not surprising that American
presidential politics has seen a move away from the dominance of
economic issues, culminating with the election of 2000.
Thus, while social class has declined as a predictor of Americans’
partisan allegiance, religiosity has increased dramatically. In
determining whether a given individual in 2000 voted for George
Bush or Al Gore, it is more instructive to know about his religious
commitments than about his economic status. The increasing
importance of religion relative to socioeconomic factors is
demonstrated in Table 1. Here, the impacts of income, education, and
religiosity on presidential vote choice are traced over a 44-year
period from 1956 to 2000 (corresponding with the availability of
these data in the American National Election Studies). In each case,
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entries in the table represent the difference in Republican vote share
between individuals in the highest category of the variable in question
and those in the lowest category (adjusted so that in every case the
comparison groups represent at least 10 percent of the sample, to
prevent misleading results stemming from extreme outliers).8 Thus,
the wealthy are compared with the poor, college graduates with high
school dropouts, and those who attend church regularly with those
who never attend religious services. The results here are
unmistakable—education has vanished as a significant predictor of
candidate choice, income remains relevant but is of declining
importance,9 and religiosity has surged into the clear lead among
these factors. Moreover, the numbers suggest that the critical
importance of religiosity in shaping presidential vote choice is not an
anomaly of the 2000 campaign. It began to emerge as a discernible
factor in the 1988 campaign, then became the most important of these
determinants in the 1992 election cycle (coincident with Pat
Buchanan’s declaration of a “culture war” at the Republican National
Convention). Clearly, religious devotion for some years now has
gained in explanatory power at the expense of more conventional
socioeconomic predictors of candidate choice. The 2000 campaign
merely marked the first time that the shift actually changed the
outcome of a presidential election.
Table 1
Impact of Selected Variables on Republican Vote Choice
(Whites)
Income Education Church Att.
1956: +35% +34% +05%
1964: +26% +25% +05%
1976: +42% +24% +03%
1988: +23% +18% +11%
1992: +14% +10% +33%
1996: +23% +12% +36%
2000: +13% -03% +37%
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To provide further insight into the centrality of moral and religious
factors in America’s current political divisions, it is instructive to
compare the magnitude of the religiosity gap with other social
cleavages that have been posited as politically salient. Table 2
presents the share of white votes won by George Bush in 2000 broken
down by region of the country, income, union membership, gender,
education, and church attendance. Not surprisingly, there are
discernible differences in candidate choice along all of these
dimensions (with the exception of education—presidential preference
in 2000 was fairly constant across the education spectrum). More
striking, however, is the fact that religiosity’s effect is more than twice
as large as that stemming from any of the other variables. While
region, income, and union membership shed significant light on
individuals’ political preferences, they are dwarfed in importance by
the religion variable. The much-ballyhooed gender gap, despite all of
the ink spilled analyzing its significance, turns out to be a rather
modest 9 percent—not inconsequential, but paling by comparison
with the chasm that is the religion gap.10 Thus, there should be no
doubt as to the central role that moral and religious factors must play
in any explanation of the 2000 presidential election.
Table 2
2000 Bush Vote by Selected Social Characteristics (Whites)
Region of Residence
South 66%
Non-South 49% Region Gap = 17%
Annual Household Income
>$100,000 59%
<$25,000 45% Income Gap = 14%
Union Membership
Non-member 55%
Member 42% Labor Gap = 13%
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Gender
Male 58%
Female 49% Gender Gap = 9%
Education
High School or Less 49%
Post-Graduate 46% Education Gap = 3%
Church Attendance
Weekly + 77%
Never 42% Religion Gap = 35%
Of course, this is not the first time that religion has played a key
role in American political life. Religious people and organizations
were very active in the abolition, temperance, and civil rights
movements, and their efforts transformed politics in very important
ways. It is not even the first time that religious issues have figured
prominently in a presidential election, as candidates Al Smith and
John Kennedy could certainly attest. The new development that
distinguishes the current religiously based political alignment from
previous ones is the nature of the cleavage. In the past, religious
divisions in American politics tended to run along a denominational
divide, often pitting Catholics and Protestants on opposite sides of the
partisan battle. In 2000, however, the forces uniting religiously
observant white Christians of different denominational backgrounds
were much stronger than those dividing them.11 The relevant question,
generally speaking, for candidate choice in 2000 was not where one
went to church, but whether one went to church. The figures in Table
3 reflect this new religious divide. For the first time, devout adherents
of all of America’s major white religious traditions12 lined up solidly
behind the same candidate (in this case George Bush), with each
group giving him more than 70 percent support. Conversely, Gore’s
solid support coalition was composed of secular whites and ethnic
minorities (blacks, Hispanics, and Jews). Those in the middle, who
did not give overwhelming support to either candidate, were the
nominal members of the various white Christian religious traditions—
those who profess affiliation with a specific religious group, but who
Moral Visions and the New American Politics
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are not particularly orthodox or devout. They are the key political
battleground for whose allegiance the two parties must struggle,
people who are, generally speaking, not wedded to either of the
starkly different moral visions that have come to characterize the
poles of modern American politics.
Table 3
2000 Bush Vote by Religious Group15
Mormons 88%
White Observant Evangelical Protestants 86%
White Observant Main-Line Protestants 75%
White Observant Roman Catholics 70%
White Nominal Main-Line Protestants 48%
White Nominal Evangelical Protestants 46%
White Nominal Roman Catholics 35%
Secular Whites 30%
Hispanic Catholics and Protestants 28%
Jews 23%
Black Protestants 4%
So what exactly, one might reasonably ask, are these competing
visions? Put differently, what are the weapons with which the
political combatants join battle over the terrain described above?
Church attendance and religiosity, heretofore analyzed as the main
variables of significance, are really just proxies for much deeper and
more comprehensive divisions stemming from fundamentally
divergent world views. One of the moral visions, embraced in greater
or lesser degree by a large segment of the American electorate, might
be termed “moral libertarianism.” Its adherents have applauded the
weakening of traditional norms in American society, particularly on
issues of sexuality and the family. They would welcome a decreased
role for religion in American public life, regarding religious
institutions often as knee-jerk defenders of an outmoded, restrictive,
and increasingly irrelevant system of moral strictures. The buzz words
for this group are “tolerance” and “choice,” invoked to combat legal
barriers and social pressures against issues ranging from abortion to
Moral Visions and the New American Politics
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gay rights to unwed motherhood to the use of narcotics. On the other
side, these moral libertarians confront a similarly large group devoted
to “moral traditionalism.” These individuals see much of the cultural
change of the past 40 years as fundamentally destructive, and attribute
many contemporary social ills such as crime, illegitimacy, and drug
addiction to the erosion of consensus on basic moral norms in
America. For them, America’s Judeo-Christian religious heritage is
fundamental to the nation’s identity and should be embraced rather
than shunned in institutions and public life. Their mantra is “family
values,” generally taken to mean the defense of the traditional
familial unit against the evils of abortion, divorce, homosexuality, and
promiscuity so blithely embraced, as they see it, by the moral
libertarians.
The historical roots of these competing moral visions, at least from
a partisan political standpoint, stretch back 30 years. In a 10-year
period in America in the 1960s and 1970s, school prayer was
outlawed, abortion was made available on demand, the contemporary
feminist movement rose to social prominence, and the gay rights
movement was born. These events delighted moral libertarians,
dismayed moral traditionalists, and galvanized both. Indeed, the
beginnings of evangelical Christian political activism date from just
after this period, with the formation of Jerry Falwell’s “Moral
Majority.” Yet, not surprisingly, political developments at the elite
level take some time to trickle down to the masses in the electorate.
Dimensions of political contestation and patterns of partisan
allegiance rarely change overnight.13 Thus, not until the 1980s did
these contending moral visions begin reliably to separate adherents of
the two major parties (as reflected in Table 1). In that decade and into
the 1990s, school prayer, abortion, and gay rights emerged as clearly
partisan political issues, and the “right” positions on these questions
increasingly became part of the parties’ recognized orthodoxies.
Even these hot-button issues, however, are merely manifestations
of the previously discussed world views that differ at a more
fundamental level. A short battery of questions present in the 2000
American National Election Study sheds some light on the
contending groups’ widely divergent views of morality and society. In
each case, respondents were given a statement with which they could
Moral Visions and the New American Politics
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agree or disagree. Table 4 breaks down these responses by presenting
the percentage of those who “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”
with each statement who voted for George Bush in 2000.14 The
differences are stark. Those who embrace the “newer lifestyles” are
35 percent less likely to vote for Bush than those who reject them.
Those who emphasize “traditional family ties” are fully 45 percent
more likely to support Bush than are those who doubt these ties as a
solution to America’s social problems. Finally, in two different but
related formulations of the question, ethical relativists are over 40
percent less likely to support Bush than are ethical absolutists.
Clearly, these competing moral visions are real, measurable, and of
tremendous political consequence.
Table 4
2000 Bush Vote by Response to Selected Survey Items
“The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our
society.”
Strongly Agree: 64% Bush Vote
Strongly Disagree: 31% Bush Vote
“The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of
moral behavior to those changes.”
Strongly Agree: 34% Bush Vote
Strongly Disagree: 75% Bush Vote
“This country would have many fewer problems if there were more
emphasis on traditional family ties.”
Strongly Agree: 65% Bush Vote
Strongly Disagree: 20% Bush Vote
“We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according
to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our
own.”
Strongly Agree: 38% Bush Vote
Strongly Disagree: 79% Bush Vote
Moral Visions and the New American Politics
10
03352 Wilson Text FA  4/28/03  10:42 AM  Page 10
Thus, it appears clear that a religious-secular cleavage, rooted in
starkly different moral visions of the good society, has come to play
over the past several elections a very prominent role in American
politics, upsetting the applecart of economically based electoral
forecasting in 2000. It is important, however, to mention some caveats
to the morally based partisan dichotomy presented here, as there are
at least two major groups that do not fit neatly into the scheme
outlined above.
The most glaring exception to the new partisan alignment based on
religion and morality is the African American community (and, to a
lesser and perhaps more transitory extent, the Latino community).
Even though African Americans are overwhelmingly Christian, more
religiously observant on average than whites, and generally more
conservative on issues like abortion, school prayer, and homo-
sexuality, they remain strongly committed to the Democratic party. A
paltry 4 percent of blacks in the 2000 election supported George
Bush, despite his efforts at an ethnically inclusive campaign. More
significantly, African Americans are the only major group in the
population for whom increased religiosity is associated with more
Democratic vote choice. Clearly, the religious dimension of politics
works very differently in the black community than it does in the rest
of the population. The moral issues that have gained the Republicans
so many adherents among white Christians have gotten them
virtually no traction among African Americans, leaving blacks
standing largely apart from the morally based realignment that is
reshaping white Americans’ political allegiances.
A second group that has a difficult time finding its place in this new
electoral landscape is what one might term the “Christian left.” These
are people within all of the major Christian traditions who emphasize
a social justice theology and who would reject as a false dichotomy
the distinction between moral and economic issues. For them, the
distribution of wealth in society and the plight of the poor are moral
issues. Many of them may be sympathetic to the Republican stance on
abortion, but much more drawn to the Democratic party’s positions on
social welfare issues. In their eyes, they face an increasingly
unpalatable political choice between one party that tends to
marginalize if not outright denigrate religion in public life, and
Moral Visions and the New American Politics
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another party that emphasizes a skewed view of Christianity elevating
personal morality at the expense of a social conscience. Although
these individuals are relatively few in the electorate, they tend to be
over-represented among Christian intellectuals and clergy in many
denominations, and thus bear watching as the ongoing realignment
unfolds.
As the primary purpose of this essay is descriptive and analytical
rather than prescriptive and normative, it largely has avoided the
question of whether the changing basis of political contestation
revealed in the 2000 election is “desirable.” There are many argu-
ments that could be offered to support either side on this score, from
a variety of different perspectives. The question should not be
answered from a partisan perspective, because the new religiously
based cleavage does not provide a strong advantage for either major
party. Although it clearly worked to the benefit of Republicans in
2000 by partially obscuring the importance of economic con-
siderations, it could just as easily have worked to the advantage of
Democrats had the circumstances been reversed. It is important to
remember that the moral libertarians are just as numerous as the moral
traditionalists, and just as committed to their vision of the good
society. If anything, the basic political dynamic produced by the new
religious/moral cleavage is one of electoral closeness, which could
work to the advantage of either party depending on the circumstances.
The more fundamental and troubling consequence of this new politics
of moral visions is a decreased opportunity for political accommoda-
tion and compromise. When parties are arguing primarily over
whether the top marginal tax rate should be 30 percent or 40 percent,
they can easily compromise at 35 percent and get a result that every-
one can live with. When they are arguing, however, over whether the
definition of marriage should be expanded to include same-sex
couples, it is much harder to “split the difference.” Moral convictions,
by their very nature, are difficult to compromise. Indeed, most moral
and ethical systems teach specifically that they should not be
compromised. Thus, while the new alignment in American politics
does not promise a path to dominance for either major party, it does
seem likely to yield a more contentious and divisive politics in the
years to come.
Moral Visions and the New American Politics
12
03352 Wilson Text FA  4/28/03  10:42 AM  Page 12
Endnotes
1 For a summary of many of the most prominent of these models and their com-
ponents, see James E. Campbell and James C. Garand, eds. Before the Vote:
Forecasting American National Elections (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 2000).
2 See Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Economic Discontent and
Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic
Judgments in Congressional Voting,” American Journal of Political Science
23 (1979): 495-527 and Kinder and Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: The
American Case,” British Journal of Political Science 11 (1981): 129-161 for
a discussion on the importance of economic evaluations in shaping
individuals’ voting decisions.
3 This essay draws extensively on data from the American National Election
Studies. See Virginia Sapiro and Steven J. Rosenstone, American National
Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1948-2000 (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-uni-
versity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2002) for details on the
scope, administration, and content of these studies.
4 For more on Goldwater’s views, priorities, and philosophy, see Barry M.
Goldwater with Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1988).
5 Timothy A. Byrnes, Catholic Bishops in American Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991) provides a good discussion on the abortion
issue in the 1976 campaign.
6 For elaboration of the post-materialism thesis, see Ronald Inglehart, “The
Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial
Societies,” American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 991-1017; Ronald
Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1990); Ronald Inglehart and Scott C. Flanagan,
“Value Change in Industrial Societies,” American Political Science Review 81
(1987): 1289-1319; and Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, “Economic
Security and Value Change,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994):
336-354. 
7 For a discussion on the place of post-material issues on the European right, see
Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western
Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press, 1995).
8 It is important to note that black (but not Hispanic) Americans are excluded
from these calculations. Indeed, blacks stand as a notable exception to all the
general partisan patterns identified here, remaining overwhelmingly
Democratic regardless of religiosity (and income, for that matter). The
significance of this reality will be discussed later.
9 The declining role of affluence in motivating Republican vote choice is
reflected not only at the individual level, but at the state level as well. In the
2000 election, George Bush won all five of the poorest states in the union
(West Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Montana), and all but
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THE CARY M. MAGUIRE CENTER FOR ETHICS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
The leaders of Southern Methodist University believe that a university
does not fully discharge its responsibility to its students and to the communi-
ty at large if it hands out knowledge (and the power which that knowledge
eventually yields) without posing questions about its responsible uses.
Through the Cary M. Maguire Center for Ethics and Public Responsibility,
SMU strives to foster the moral education and public responsibilities of those
whom it empowers by:
n Supporting faculty research, teaching, and writing in ethics that cross disci-
plinary, professional, racial/cultural, and gender lines;
n Strengthening the ethics component in SMU’s undergraduate and profes-
sional curriculum;
n Awarding grants to SMU students who wish to study issues in ethics or
engage in community service.
SMU also believes that a university and the professions cannot ignore the
urban habitat they helped to create and on which they depend. Thus, while
not an advocacy group, the Maguire Center seeks to be integrally a part of the
Metroplex, attending to the moral quandaries and controversies that beset our
common life. To that end, the Center:
n Has created an Ethics Center Advisory Board of professional and commu-
nity leaders;
n Organizes local seminars, colloquia, and workshops featuring SMU and vis-
iting scholars;
n Publishes occasional papers and books based on the Center’s endeavors that
will be of interest to both academics and the general public.
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